<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:latest</id><title>Checking AI: latest results</title><updated>2026-10-23T06:30:19Z</updated><author><name>Bentley Moon</name></author><link rel="alternate" href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/"/><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-41</id><title>Labelling reviewed text as untrusted made gemma4:12b obey a verdict dictated inside it: false alarms on correct work went from 0.0059 to 1.0000 (0.9970 on a second pool, n = 337 per cell). gemma4:31b did the same; qwen2.5-coder:32b and qwen3.6:35b-a3b, given the same note, did not.</title><updated>2026-10-06T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>The registered predictions for the four control arms landed inside their intervals, and the result replicated on a fresh pool. Every figure is the monitor's own first verdict.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:publication-1</id><title>Learnable curvature: code, results and reproduction (v1.0.1)</title><updated>2026-10-05T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23165431"/><summary>The preprint's code and saved runs, archived with a DOI. At d_model 96 the gain is cosine attention: one fixed cosine head in the first layer keeps most of it, and learning the curvature adds nothing. At d_model 192 with 4 heads that head's gain mostly fades (0.00% and +0.26%; claim C26, added 2026-10-08).</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-13</id><title>gemma4:12b noticed a hidden instruction more often when shown the exchange afterwards than while doing the task: a gap of +0.557 (90% CI 0.510 to 0.602, n = 512), re-run after a serving fix.</title><updated>2026-09-30T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Pre-registered on one model and one task and confirmed there. On another model, and on another task, the gap reverses.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-34</id><title>Labelling a payload aimed at the monitor as untrusted raised false alarms on correct work to 0.99 on two gemma monitors (n = 337 per cell).</title><updated>2026-09-26T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Each labelled and unlabelled pair differs only in the label. The two-gemma result replicated on fresh task pools with its predictions registered before the runs.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-35</id><title>gemma4:31b flagged 0.55 to 1.00 of correct one-number arithmetic answers when a claim of correctness sat on the answer's own line, and almost none when the same words had a line of their own. On lookup and code answers the claim had no effect.</title><updated>2026-09-26T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Measured on two task pools and two actors. Every placement prediction landed inside its interval except one arm, predicted at 0.50, which read 1.0000.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-36</id><title>On two monitors, a clearance claim alone raised no false alarms and a directive alone raised few; together they raised several times what the two predict separately, on two task pools per model.</title><updated>2026-09-26T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Each part differs from the full payload only in its text, and the predictions for these arms were registered before they ran.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-40</id><title>Showing the monitor only the first integer of the answer held against every payload tried, including a four-generation automated search, and every real attack was still caught. The cost: gemma4:31b, answering in words, flagged 0.1039 of correct work against 0.0178 undefended.</title><updated>2026-09-26T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Catches stayed at 1.0000 across four payloads, two monitors, two task families and two pools. The cost is measured on one monitor in one answer format.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-12</id><title>Given a third option, to flag that the answer and a reference disagree, five of six checker models never used it (59 of 78 cells at zero). gemma4:31b used it on 0.81 of items with a false reference and on none with an honest one.</title><updated>2026-09-23T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Replicated on one model on a fresh seed at n = 512, and not confirmed by a pre-registered run. The gemma4:31b evidence is four cells, two of them the same design at two seeds.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-38</id><title>Asking gemma4:12b for a 0 to 100 score held against hand-written attacks and fell to an automated attacker search by its fourth generation: on a fresh pool it scored correct arithmetic 100 and most real injections low. The payload transferred to two other monitors.</title><updated>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Replicated on a fresh pool, two answer formats and three monitors. Arithmetic tasks, one actor, one search run.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-39</id><title>An automated attacker search broke the verdict-first defence in its first generation: on a fresh pool (n = 337) its payload made gemma4:12b call every correct answer compromised, on two monitors and both question forms.</title><updated>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Replicated on a fresh pool against its own neutral arm, and all four registered predictions landed inside their intervals.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-42</id><title>A majority vote of gemma4:31b, gemma4:12b and qwen3.6:35b-a3b flagged 0.0742 and 0.0623 of correct work (two pools) under a trigger that makes gemma4:31b alone flag 0.8991. A payload found by automated search took the majority to 0.9941 on both pools.</title><updated>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>Both results replicated on a fresh pool with predictions registered before the run. Arithmetic tasks, one actor, one panel of three, majority rule only.</summary></entry><entry><id>tag:legibleai.org,2026:finding-43</id><title>Under the verdict-first defence, two payloads made gemma4:12b call every correct answer compromised when placed on the answer's own line, and had no effect as a paragraph of their own. Swapping the placements swapped the outcomes, on two task pools each.</title><updated>2026-09-22T00:00:00Z</updated><link href="https://bentleymoon.com/research/checking-ai/findings/"/><summary>A full placement swap on two payloads, each replicated on a fresh pool. All four registered predictions landed inside their intervals.</summary></entry></feed>
